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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by defendant Ellwood Group, Inc., 
(Ellwood) from a final judgment enter ed against it by the 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in 
favor of plaintiff Uddeholm Tooling AB (Uddeholm). This 
complicated commercial case emerges fr om the 
disintegration of a joint venture enter ed into by Ellwood, a 
Pennsylvania corporation in the business of for ging steel 
ingots into various components of heavy machinery, and 
 
                                2 
  
Uddeholm, a Swedish company that produces specialty tool 
steels. Uddeholm brought numerous claims against 
Ellwood, including breach of contract, br each of fiduciary 
duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, and civil 
conspiracy. Resolution of this appeal requir es us to address 
a number of questions of Pennsylvania contract, business 
tort, and damages law, along with two questions on the 
application of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 
The most important issue involves the question whether 
the joint venture agreement was ambiguous as a matter of 
law as to whether Ellwood could properly claim rebates for 
its sales to third parties of ingots pr oduced by the Ellwood- 
Uddeholm Steel Company (EUS), the entity for med by the 
joint venture, or whether Ellwood was limited to rebates for 
sales by EUS to Ellwood for Ellwood's own use. Uddeholm 
maintains that the latter interpretation r eflects not only the 
clear intent of the contracting parties but also the raison 
d'etre of the contract. We conclude that the District Court 
was correct in finding a contractual ambiguity. We also 
conclude, however, that it erred in instructing the jury that 
Ellwood had the burden of establishing the meaning of the 
disputed terms in the agreement because of the fiduciary 
relationship between the parties that was cr eated by the 
joint venture. We must therefor e vacate the jury verdict on 
the contract claim and remand for a new trial. 
 
Other important issues include: (1) whether Uddeholm's 
breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of trade 
secrets claims were covered and thus precluded by its 
breach of contract claim; (2) whether Ellwood's potential 
liability on the civil conspiracy claim was for eclosed 
because the jury found no other conspirator; (3) whether 
Uddeholm could recover on its contract claim for rebates 
Ellwood received in 1991; (4) the inter est rate to be applied 
to sums Uddeholm owed Ellwood for post-ventur e 
purchases of steel; and (5) two evidentiary questions: the 
admissibility of a document under Fed. R. Evid. 807 (the 
residual exception to the hearsay rule), and whether the 
court erred by requiring redaction of an Uddeholm 
employee's memo before admitting it into evidence. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's decision allowing 
Uddeholm to recover on its fiduciary duty claims, for the 
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wrongful behavior that underlies this claim was not covered 
by the joint venture agreement. However , we will set aside 
both the verdict for Uddeholm on the misappr opriation 
claim (because it was covered by the joint venture 
agreement) and the verdict on the civil conspiracy claim (as 
there was insufficient evidence of the existence of a second 
co-conspirator, which is required under Pennsylvania law). 
With respect to the latter issue, we r eject Uddeholm's 
contention that Ellwood did not validly preserve its 
objection. We will also set aside the District Court's order 
that applied a 6% interest rate to the sums Uddeholm owed 
Ellwood for steel that it bought post-ventur e, and remand 
for further findings of fact on this issue. W e will affirm the 
District Court's evidentiary rulings, because its application 
of Rule 807 and its redaction of the employee's memo were 
not abuses of the court's discretion. W e therefore will affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Prior to 1984, Ellwood relied on outside manufacturers to 
supply it with steel ingots for its steel-for ging business. In 
early 1984, Ellwood decided to construct an ingot mill in 
Ellwood City, PA, in order to produce its own supply of 
steel, which it did under the name Ellwood City For ge Steel 
Company (ECF). At around this time, Uddeholm decided 
that it wanted to set up a manufacturing plant in the 
United States in order to avoid quotas on imports of tool 
steel from Sweden, deliver steel more quickly, and avoid 
currency fluctuations. The two companies entered 
negotiations with an eye towards forming a joint venture in 
which Uddeholm would provide its steelmaking expertise 
and some funding for Ellwood's new mill, while Ellwood 
would provide Uddeholm with a U.S. sour ce of tool steel as 
well as most of the financing of the mill. 
 
After nine months of negotiation, the two companies 
entered into a joint venture agreement which comprised 
several contracts executed in April and June 1985 
(collectively, the Agreement).1 For the purposes of this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. More specifically, the joint ventur e agreement was between Uddeholm 
and Ellwood City Forge Corporation, a subsidiary of the Ellwood Group. 
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appeal, the most important of these contracts ar e the 
Shareholders Agreement, the two Steel Pur chase 
Agreements (one each for Ellwood and Uddeholm, covering 
their purchases from the new mill), and the Know-How 
License Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, 
Ellwood became an 80% shareholder and Uddeholm a 20% 
shareholder in ECF, which changed its name to the 
Ellwood-Uddeholm Steel Company (EUS). As it had with 
ECF, Ellwood continued to run the daily operations of EUS. 
The Agreement provided that EUS would sell steel ingots to 
Uddeholm and Ellwood at cost plus a percentage of this 
cost to cover overhead, which was set in the original 
contracts at 35%. "Overhead" is defined in the Agreement 
as including "all interest, depreciation, selling, general and 
administrative costs and all other costs and expenses 
which are not included as part of the `base costs' [of the 
ingots]." Uddeholm had the right to pur chase up to 10% of 
the ingots produced by EUS, and Ellwood had the right to 
purchase the rest. 
 
The Agreement included the rebate pr ovision (S 2.3 of the 
two Steel Purchase Agreements contained within the overall 
Agreement) that is central to the current dispute. This 
clause provided for "rebates" in case one of the partners 
paid more than its allotted share of EUS's overhead, which 
was based on each partner's percentage contr ol of EUS: 
80% for Ellwood, 20% for Uddeholm. More specifically, if 
the amount of Ellwood's steel purchases that went to EUS's 
overhead (i.e., the 35% over the ingot cost) exceeded 80% of 
the total sums that went to overhead during the calendar 
year, then Ellwood was entitled to a r ebate of the amount 
it paid in excess of this 80%. The same held true for 
Uddeholm, but at 20%. The Agreement also pr ovided that if 
either partner's contributions to EUS's over head totaled 
less than its percentage control of the company (i.e., if 
Ellwood's contributions were less than 80% of EUS's 
overhead, or Uddeholm's contributions wer e less than 
20%), that partner had to make payments to EUS in or der 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
After the joint venture began, Uddeholm changed its name to the Bohler- 
Uddeholm Corporation, but for simplicity we will use the name 
"Uddeholm" to refer to that corporation in this opinion. 
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to bring its share of the overhead paid to the level 
equivalent to their percentage control. This system was 
designed to ensure that Ellwood always paid exactly 80% of 
EUS's overhead, and Uddeholm paid for exactly 20%, no 
matter how much steel each was buying from EUS. 
 
As part of the Agreement, the parties established that 
after October 1, 1989, either party could cause EUS to buy 
Uddeholm's 20% stake in EUS at book value (thus making 
Ellwood the sole owner of EUS). The Agreement contained 
non-compete provisions that went into ef fect if this 
purchase option was exercised; the Agr eement granted EUS 
an exclusive license for Uddeholm's "know-how," but 
prohibited EUS from using such know-how for three years 
after the end of the joint venture. 
 
The documents comprising the Agreement included the 
Business Plan for EUS, which was incorporated by 
reference into the Shareholders Agr eement. The Business 
Plan stated that "[t]he principal purpose of EUS will be to 
supply high quality ingot to its owners, Ellwood City Forge 
Corporation and Uddeholm Tooling AB," and that "[i]ngots 
shall be cast in a variety of shapes and weights according 
to the requirements of Ellwood City For ge Corporation and 
Uddeholm Tooling AB." During the negotiations for the 
Agreement, Ellwood proposed a draft Business Plan which 
indicated that Ellwood desired to sell EUS's ingots to third- 
party purchasers in the general market. Ellwood's proposed 
Business Plan included the additional purpose for EUS that 
"[s]econdarily, [EUS] shall be operated with the purpose of 
earning the maximum possible profit fr om sale of its 
product to third parties." The pr oposal added that ingots 
shall be cast to the requirements of "third party 
purchasers" as well as Ellwood and Uddeholm, and that 
"[i]ngots may be sold to third parties to the extent permitted 
under the various contracts among EUS, Ellwood City 
Forge and Uddeholm Tooling." 
 
Uddeholm rejected these proposed alterations to the 
Business Plan, making clear to Ellwood that it did not want 
EUS's production to go to anyone but the shar eholders. 
Ellwood agreed to delete from the Business Plan all 
language to the effect that the secondary purpose of EUS 
was to sell tool steel to third parties, though there is 
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evidence in the record that the parties came to an 
understanding that perhaps marginal amounts of ingots 
would be sold by the shareholders to thir d parties if EUS's 
financial circumstances so requir ed. 
 
The EUS plant commenced operation in 1985. It is 
disputed whether EUS and Ellwood provided Uddeholm 
with full disclosure in EUS's monthly and yearly financial 
statements during the term of the joint ventur e. Uddeholm 
claims that it requested full information and did not receive 
it, while Ellwood contends that it always pr ovided full 
information. It is undisputed, however , that during the 
venture EUS sold a substantial amount of steel ingots that 
ended up going to third parties in unchanged form, i.e., not 
as forged steel products but as raw steel ingots. The proper 
characterization of these sales to third parties is the subject 
of strong disagreement between Ellwood and Uddeholm. 
Ellwood asserts that it bought the ingots fr om EUS and 
resold them to the third parties, so that it properly received 
a rebate on all these "purchases," as that term is defined in 
S 2.3 of the Steel Purchase Agreements. Uddeholm counters 
that the ingots were essentially sold dir ectly by EUS to the 
third parties at Ellwood's direction, and that Ellwood was 
not entitled to rebates on these sales because they were not 
"purchases" as defined in S 2.3 of the Steel Purchase 
Agreements. 
 
In 1987, Uddeholm designated its employee Bertil 
Rydstad to be the person responsible for Uddeholm's 
relationship with Ellwood and EUS. In Mar ch 1988, 
Rydstad wrote a memo that is a subject of dispute in this 
appeal. In that memo, Rydstad stated that he understood 
that Ellwood was free to resell the ingots bought from EUS: 
"Thus, there are only two purchasers of ingots. However, 
nothing precluded [sic] them from selling to a third party." 
At trial, the District Court ordered this language redacted 
from the memo before the memo was admitted into 
evidence because these statements involved a "legal 
interpretation by a non-legal person," and because the 
statements did not address the relevant issue of 
interpretation of the Agreement, namely, whether Ellwood 
was entitled to receive rebates for its ingot sales to third 
parties. 
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On January 29, 1991, Ellwood notified Uddeholm of 
Ellwood's intention to exercise its right under the 
Agreement to have EUS buy Uddeholm's EUS shar es at 
their December 31, 1990, book value. In March 1991, 
Deloitte & Touche prepared a r eport for EUS detailing 
EUS's book value as of December 31, 1990. Uddeholm 
objected to the calculated book value because it was about 
half of the book value determination that Ellwood had 
related to Uddeholm in November 1990. Uddeholm 
informed Ellwood that it was willing to tender its shares at 
the Deloitte & Touche calculated value subject to Uddeholm 
retaining its rights to make a legal claim for an increased 
book value. Ellwood insisted that Uddeholm accept the 
calculated book value for the stock without r etaining any 
such right to a legal claim, threatening that otherwise it 
would refuse Uddeholm's tender of its stock, which would 
keep Uddeholm responsible for 20% of EUS's over head 
through 1991 and beyond. 
 
Uddeholm then brought suit in the District Court, 
contending that the Deloitte & Touche book value 
calculation was understated because the profits that 
Ellwood collected on the ingots that were sold to third 
parties should have gone to EUS (and thus 20% to 
Uddeholm), rather than directly and solely to Ellwood. 
Uddeholm alleged in an amended complaint that Ellwood 
had violated S 2.3 of the Steel Purchase Agreements by 
claiming rebates on these sales when the sales were not 
"purchases" as the term is used in that section. On 
November 14, 1991, the parties entered into a stipulation 
under which Uddeholm tendered its shares of EUS to 
Ellwood (thus ending the joint venture), while payment for 
Uddeholm's shares would be made pursuant to an order of 
the District Court at the resolution of this litigation. 
 
After the termination of the joint ventur e in November 
1991, Ellwood created the Ellwood Specialty Steel Company 
(ESS) to sell common grades of tool steel. Ellwood r ecruited 
Ake Sundvall, a former president of Uddeholm who at that 
time was working for an Austrian steel company, A vesta, to 
become president of ESS. While Sundvall was still working 
at Avesta, Ellwood sent Uddeholm's confidential pricing, 
shipping, and customer information to Sundvall at his 
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Avesta office, an act which Uddeholm ar gues was a 
misappropriation of its trade secrets because Avesta was a 
competitor of Uddeholm's in the steel market. Uddeholm 
also contends that Sundvall and other Ellwood officials 
improperly persuaded sales representatives to leave 
Uddeholm for ESS, and then used these repr esentatives to 
solicit and sell tool steel to Uddeholm's customers in 
violation of the non-competition provisions of the 
Agreement. Uddeholm asserts that ESS sold over $13 
million worth of steel to Uddeholm's customers between 
1991 and 1994, dramatically undercutting Uddeholm's 
share of the steel market. 
 
From the time the joint venture was ter minated through 
May 1992, Uddeholm bought steel from Ellwood. During 
this time, Uddeholm did not pay Ellwood for appr oximately 
$345,000 worth of steel. Uddeholm does not dispute the 
existence of this debt, but the parties disagr ee over the rate 
of interest that should be applied to it. Ellwood argues that 
an 18% interest rate (which is the rate on its invoice order 
form and the standard rate it char ges all of its customers) 
should apply, while Uddeholm argues that the statutory 6% 
rate should apply, as the steel was bought under an 
agreement that did not involve Ellwood's standard terms. 
 
The disputes between Ellwood and Uddeholm over the 
Agreement resulted in four differ ent civil actions which 
were eventually consolidated. At trial, the District Court 
found that the Agreement was ambiguous as to whether 
Ellwood could properly claim rebates for the steel ingots 
sold to third parties, and it therefor e sent the issue of the 
correct interpretation of the Agreement to the jury. The 
court also instructed the jury that Ellwood had the burden 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these 
transactions were in accord with the ter ms of the 
Agreement. The jury returned a special verdict finding that 
Ellwood had breached the Agreement by including third 
party ingot sales in its rebate calculations, and awarded 
Uddeholm $4.1 million in compensatory damages and 
interest. The jury also found that Ellwood and David 
Barensfeld (a director of both EUS and Ellwood) had 
breached their fiduciary duties to Uddeholm, and awarded 
$45,000 in compensatory and $85,000 in punitive damages 
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for Ellwood's breach, and $70,000 in compensatory and 
$300,000 in punitive damages for Barensfeld's breach. The 
jury found further that Ellwood had breached the 
Agreement's non-competition clauses and committed the 
torts of misappropriation of trade secr ets and civil 
conspiracy; it awarded compensatory damages of $1 million 
on the non-compete claim, $150,000 on the 
misrepresentation claim, and $70,000 in punitive damages 
on the civil conspiracy claim. (The jury exonerated the other 
alleged co-conspirators.) The District Court enter ed a final 
judgment in this case on July 1, 1999. 
 
The parties reserved the issue of inter est for post-trial 
determination. After the verdict, the District Court ruled on 
this issue and various post-trial motions. The court found 
that the post-venture steel was purchased under an 
agreement that did not include Ellwood's standard terms as 
printed on its steel invoices, and thus the court applied the 
statutory 6% interest rate instead of the 18% invoice rate. 
The District Court also rejected Ellwood's ar gument that 
the rebates that Ellwood received between January 1 and 
November 14, 1991 should be excluded from the damages 
computation. The District Court then entered a superseding 
final judgment in favor of Uddeholm for $9,458,210.86 on 
September 13, 1999. 
 
This appeal timely followed.2 Because the appeal presents 
a plethora of issues, not all of which have been r eferenced 
above, it will be useful to set them forth seriatim, couched 
in terms of Ellwood's contentions: 
 
       1. Did the District Court err in finding that the 
       Agreement was ambiguous as a matter of law 
       regarding whether Ellwood could pr operly claim 
       rebates for third-party sales of ingots pr oduced by 
       EUS (in contrast to being limited to rebates on 
       purchases for its own use, which Uddeholm claims 
       was the clear intent of the contracting parties)? 
 
       2. Did the District Court err in its instruction to the 
       jury that Ellwood had the burden of establishing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1332, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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       the meaning of disputed contract terms in the 
       Agreement? 
 
       3. Did the District Court err in other jury instructions 
 
         i) by not specifically identifying the allegedly 
       ambiguous terms in the Agreement and the 
       alternative interpretations of these ter ms; 
 
         ii) by giving insufficient instruction on the 
       applicable principles of contract 
       interpretation; 
 
         iii) by giving the instruction that it was 
       "undisputed" that both parties were to"share 
       the benefits" of the joint venture, which 
       Ellwood alleges was biased in favor of 
       Uddeholm's interpretation of the Agreement; 
 
         iv) by giving an instruction on pr oving damages 
       for lost profits from a breach of a covenant not 
       to compete which Ellwood alleges was a 
       misstatement of Pennsylvania law; and 
 
         v) by not instructing the jury that it should 
       decide whether Ellwood's 420 Series of steel 
       fell into the category of "tool steel" as defined 
       under the covenant not to compete? 
 
       4. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to 
       consider the misappropriation of trade secr ets tort 
       claim because the behavior that was alleged to 
       constitute this breach was covered by the terms of 
       the Agreement? 
 
       5. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to 
       consider the breach of fiduciary duty claims 
       because the behavior that was alleged to constitute 
       this breach was also covered by the ter ms of the 
       Agreement? 
 
       6. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to 
       consider the breach of fiduciary claim against 
       David Barensfeld (a director of both Ellwood and 
       EUS), because, as Ellwood alleges, Uddeholm 
       lacked standing to sue Barensfeld for this alleged 
       breach? 
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       7. Can Ellwood be liable for civil conspiracy given that 
       all of the alleged co-conspirators were exonerated 
       by the jury, and was this issue preserved in the 
       District Court? 
 
       8. Did the District Court err in allowing Uddeholm to 
       recover damages that included the rebates received 
       by Ellwood from EUS in 1991? 
 
       9. Did the District Court err in admitting an affidavit 
       by Bo Jonsson into evidence? 
 
       10. Did the District Court err in requiring redaction in 
       the Bertil Rydstad memo before admitting it into 
       evidence? 
 
       11. Did the District Court err by applying the 
       statutory 6% interest rate instead of Ellwood's 
       standard 18% rate to money that Uddeholm owed 
       Ellwood for post-venture purchases of steel? 
 
We address in the main text of this opinion only the issues 
numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 through 11. Ellwood's 
contentions listed in numbers 3 and 6 are addr essed in the 
margin infra at footnotes 9 and 13; we summarily affirm 
the District Court on those issues. 
 
II. Was the Agreement Ambiguous?  
 
The District Court found, as a matter of law, that the 
Agreement was ambiguous as to whether Ellwood could 
make sales to third parties of ingots pr oduced by EUS, keep 
the profits from these sales to itself, and get rebates on 
these sales when its contributions to EUS's over head 
reached more than 80% of EUS's total over head costs. The 
court thus sent the matter of the interpretation of the 
Agreement to the jury, which found that Ellwood breached 
the Agreement and awarded Uddeholm $4.1 million in 
compensatory damages and interest for this br each. 
Ellwood challenges the District Court's deter mination that 
the contract was ambiguous. We have plenary r eview of this 
matter. See Pacitti v. Macy's, 193 F .3d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 
1999); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F .3d 142, 145 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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The main disputed part of the Agreement is the following 
provision, which is contained in the Steel Pur chase 
Agreement between EUS and Ellwood: 
 
       S 2.3 Price Adjustment or Rebate for Contribution. 
       Within 90 days after the end of each calendar year of 
       Seller [EUS], the prices with respect to the purchase of 
       Products during the preceding calendar year by Buyer 
       [Ellwood] shall be adjusted by way of r ebate (after 
       giving effect to quarterly estimated allowances) if 
       Buyer's Purchases (net of retur ns and allowances) in 
       any year constitute more than 80% of the aggr egate 
       amount received by Seller in such year in excess of 
       aggregate above defined "base costs" for such year 
       (hereinafter for this Section 2.3 referr ed to as 
       "Contribution"). 
 
(emphasis added). Ellwood argues that this clause 
unambiguously allowed it to get rebates on all its 
purchases from EUS when Ellwood's contribution to EUS's 
overhead surpassed 80%, regardless of whether Ellwood 
turned around and immediately sold the purchased ingots 
to third parties. 
 
Uddeholm responds that this clause is ambiguous 
because it is not clear on its face whether "Buyer's 
Purchases" is limited to purchases for the buyer's own use 
only. Uddeholm contends that other evidence (both 
contained within the Agreement and extrinsic to it) shows 
that the disputed clause is limited to purchases for the 
buyer's own use, and thus the ingots that Ellwood bought 
from EUS and resold did not count as "Buyer's Purchases" 
for rebate calculation purposes. As we have noted, the 
District Court accepted Uddeholm's contention that the 
Agreement was ambiguous and sent the issue of 
interpreting the Agreement to the jury, which agreed with 
Uddeholm's proffered interpr etation of the Agreement. Our 
task is to review this determination by the District Court, 
which requires us to examine the principles of contract 
interpretation under Pennsylvania law. Both parties agree 
that Pennsylvania law governs this case. 
 
A. Pennsylvania Law on Contract Interpretation 
 
Pennsylvania law on contract interpretation and 
ambiguity is somewhat complicated; while the br oad 
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principles are clear, it is not a seamless web, and hence we 
will have to review some of the relevant Pennsylvania cases 
before applying the law to the facts at bar . Pennsylvania 
contract law begins with the "firmly settled" point that "the 
intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in 
the writing itself." Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 
638, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Steuart v. McChesney, 
444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982)). " `Where the intention of the 
parties is clear, there is no need to r esort to extrinsic aids 
or evidence,' " instead, the meaning of a clear and 
unequivocal written contract " `must be determined by its 
contents alone.' " Steuart, 444 A.2d at 661 (quoting East 
Crossroads Ctr., Inc. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 205 A.2d 865, 866 
(Pa. 1965)). "[W]here language is clear and unambiguous, 
the focus of interpretation is upon the ter ms of the 
agreement as manifestly expressed , rather than as, 
perhaps, silently intended." Id."Clear contractual terms 
that are capable of one reasonable interpr etation must be 
given effect without reference to matters outside the 
contract." Krizovensky, 624 A.2d at 642. 
 
A court may, however, look outside the "four corners" of 
a contract if the contract's terms are unclear: "[w]here the 
contract terms are ambiguous and susceptible of more than 
one reasonable interpretation, . . . the court is free to 
receive extrinsic evidence, i.e., par ol evidence, to resolve the 
ambiguity." Id. But because Pennsylvania presumes that 
the writing conveys the parties' intent, a contract 
 
       will be found ambiguous if, and only if, it is r easonably 
       or fairly susceptible of different constructions and is 
       capable of being understood in more senses than one 
       and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of 
       expression or has a double meaning. A contract is not 
       ambiguous if the court can determine its meaning 
       without any guide other than a knowledge of the 
       simple facts on which, from the nature of the language 
       in general, its meaning depends; and a contract is not 
       rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties 
       do not agree on the proper construction. 
 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Samuel Rappaport Family 
Partnership v. Meridian Bank, 657 A.2d 17, 21-22 (Pa. 
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Super. Ct. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 
determine whether ambiguity exists in a contract, the court 
may consider "the words of the contract, the alternative 
meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the 
objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning." 
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc. , 619 F.2d 1001, 
1011 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
Ambiguity in a contract can be either patent or latent. 
While a patent ambiguity appears on the face of the 
instrument, "a latent ambiguity arises fr om extraneous or 
collateral facts which make the meaning of a written 
agreement uncertain although the language ther eof, on its 
face, appears clear and unambiguous." Duquesne Light, 66 
F.3d at 614 (citing Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 
137 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1957)). A party may use extrinsic 
evidence to support its claim of latent ambiguity, but this 
evidence must show that some specific term or terms in the 
contract are ambiguous; it cannot simply show that the 
parties intended something different that was not 
incorporated into the contract. "[L]est the ambiguity inquiry 
degenerate into an impermissible analysis of the parties' 
subjective intent, such an inquiry appropriately is confined 
to `the parties linguistic reference.' . . . [T]he parties' 
expectations, standing alone, are irrelevant without any 
contractual hook on which to pin them." Id. at 614 & n.9 
(quoting Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011 n.12) (emphasis 
added). 
 
Furthermore, the alternative meaning that a party seeks 
to ascribe to the specific term in the contract must be 
reasonable; courts must resist twisting the language of the 
contract beyond recognition. "In holding that an ambiguity 
is present in an agreement, a court must not rely upon a 
strained contrivancy to establish one; scarcely an 
agreement could be conceived that might not be 
unreasonably contrived into the appearance of ambiguity. 
Thus, the meaning of language cannot be distorted to 
establish the ambiguity." Steuart, 444 A.2d at 663. 
 
Pennsylvania law on ambiguity in contracts thus seems 
to contain a built-in tension between two principles: (1) a 
contract is not ambiguous, and thus must be interpr eted 
on its face without reference to extrinsic evidence, "if the 
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court can determine its meaning without any guide other 
than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, fr om the 
nature of the language in general, its meaning depends," 
Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 614 (quoting Meridian Bank, 
657 A.2d at 21-22); and (2) contractual terms that are clear 
on their face can be latently ambiguous, and "Pennsylvania 
law permits courts to examine certain for ms of extrinsic 
evidence in determining whether a contract is ambiguous." 
Id. Thus, when a court is faced with a contract containing 
facially unambiguous language, it seems that Pennsylvania 
law both requires that the court interpr et the language 
without using extrinsic evidence, and allows the court to 
bring in extrinsic evidence to prove latent ambiguity. 
 
Mellon Bank resolves this tension by allowing only 
extrinsic evidence of a certain nature to establish latent 
ambiguity in a contract; a court should deter mine whether 
the type of extrinsic evidence offered could be used to 
support a reasonable alternative interpr etation under the 
precepts of Pennsylvania law on contract interpretation.3 
See Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011-14. Once the court 
determines that a party has offer ed extrinsic evidence 
capable of establishing latent ambiguity, a decision as to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In particular, we think that the key inquiry in this context will 
likely 
be whether the proffered extrinsic evidence is about the parties' 
objectively manifested "linguistic reference" regarding the terms ofthe 
contract, or is instead merely about their expectations. Duquesne Light 
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F .3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
former is the right type of extrinsic evidence for establishing latent 
ambiguity under Pennsylvania law, while the latter is not. See id. For 
example, if the evidence showed that the parties nor mally meant to refer 
to Canadian dollars when they used the term"dollars," this would be 
evidence of the right type. See id. at 1011 n.12. Evidence regarding a 
party's beliefs about the general ramifications of the contract would not 
be the right type to establish latent ambiguity. See id. at 1014 
(rejecting 
extrinsic evidence that showed that one party to a disputed contract 
thought it bore some risk of borrower's default as insufficient to vary 
the 
clear meaning of the term "insolvent" as used in the contract). Put 
another way, a party offers the right type of extrinsic evidence for 
establishing latent ambiguity if the evidence can be used to support "a 
reasonable alternative semantic reference" for specific terms contained in 
the contract. Mellon Bank N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Cr edit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 
1012 n.13 (3d Cir. 1980). See infra pp. 22-26 & n.4. 
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which of the competing interpretations of the contract is 
the correct one is reserved for the factfinder, who would 
examine the content of the extrinsic evidence (along with all 
the other evidence) in order to make this deter mination. 
See Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011, 1013-14. We will follow 
Mellon Bank's approach. 
 
Of course, any use of extrinsic evidence to support an 
alternative interpretation of facially unambiguous language 
must be careful not to cross the "point at which 
interpretation becomes alteration of the written contract." 
Id. at 1011. This point is not clearly defined by 
Pennsylvania law. However, even a brief examination of the 
particular facts and holdings of some repr esentative cases 
involving contract ambiguity summarized in the mar gin 
establish that: (1) mere disagreement between the parties 
over the meaning of a term is insufficient to establish that 
term as ambiguous; (2) each party's pr offered interpretation 
must be reasonable, in that there must be evidence in the 
contract to support the interpretation beyond the party's 
mere claim of ambiguity; and (3) the pr offered 
interpretation cannot contradict the common 
understanding of the disputed term or phrase when there 
is another term that the parties could easily have used to 
convey this contradictory meaning.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1982), the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court considered whether ther e was ambiguity in a right of 
first refusal clause that stated that, upon the receipt of a bona fide 
offer, 
certain real property could be pur chased at a price "equivalent to the 
market value of the premises according to the assessment rolls." The 
trial court determined that the clause was ambiguous, and that the 
evidence showed that the clause really meant that the property could be 
purchased at "not less than the market value of the premises according 
to the assessment rolls." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court roundly 
rejected this determination. "T o no extent is the term `equivalent', 
meaning `equal', interchangeable with `not less than', and, since the 
parties specified the former, they shall be deemed to have intended the 
same," despite the fact that the market value according to the 
assessment rolls was substantially less than several bona fide offers. Id. 
at 664 (footnote omitted). 
 
Similarly, in Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993), the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a trial court decision 
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In United Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 189 A.2d 574 (Pa. 
1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set out guidelines 
for an acceptable finding of ambiguity in a facially 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that found ambiguity in the phrase "fully r educed annuity." The trial 
court had concluded that, because the two parties disagreed over how to 
interpret this term, it was ambiguous, and thus it looked at extrinsic 
evidence. The Superior Court reversed because the interpretation 
accepted by the trial court changed the meaning of the phrase from 
"fully reduced annuity" to "partially reduced annuity." Since these two 
phrases mean entirely different things and thus in effect contradict one 
another (if an annuity is fully reduced it is not partially reduced, and 
vice versa), the Superior Court held that the parties would not have used 
the one term when they meant the other , because they could easily have 
used this other term. "The construction ur ged by [the plaintiff] changes 
the meaning of a clearly defined term. . . . The terms of the agreement 
in this case were disputed, but they wer e not ambiguous." Id. at 643. 
While an alternate interpretation that merely narrows or expands the 
definition of a term is acceptable, Krizovensky rejects the wholesale 
change of a term's definition. 
 
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 66 F.3d 604 (3d 
Cir. 1995), this Court rejected the plaintiff 's contention that a 
contract 
was ambiguous as to whether it contained a 40-year guarantee for steam 
generators in a nuclear power plant. The plaintif f argued that 
contractual language that contained an assumption of a 42-year station 
life in setting out technical specifications for certain components could 
be interpreted as providing a 40-year guarantee for the steam 
generators. We rejected this interpr etation as unreasonable because the 
"contractual hook" did not support the pr offered interpretation: 
"Duquesne's reading would stretch this language to unimaginable 
proportions, as it would turn the 42 year station life by which certain 
components were to be judged into an expr ess contractual guarantee 
that the steam generators themselves would last for 40 years." Id. at 
614. 
 
Finally, in Mellon Bank N. A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 
1001 (3d Cir. 1980), we considered whether sufficient evidence had been 
presented to justify finding ambiguity in the term "insolvent" in a 
contract between sophisticated commercial parties. Mellon used extrinsic 
evidence to argue that the liabilities and assets that accrued from the 
contracted-for project should not be used in determining whether a party 
was "insolvent" under the contract. The district court accepted Mellon's 
use of extrinsic evidence, but this Court reversed because "[t]he district 
court cited no basis in the contract document or wor ding of the 
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unambiguous term. Jenkins owed money to United and 
entered into a contract to sell United all the oil that he 
produced. The contested phrase in the oil contract stated 
that the contract was to continue "so long as there remains 
any unpaid indebtedness" of Jenkins to United. Id. at 579. 
Jenkins defaulted on the loan, but then argued that the oil 
contract was still in force and that United had to buy his 
oil because he still owed money to United. United ar gued 
that the contested phrase in the oil contract should be 
interpreted to mean that the agreement would continue so 
long as Jenkins remained indebted to United and Jenkins 
had not defaulted in his obligations. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted United's 
interpretation of the phrase, even though doing so required 
the court to interpret a facially unambiguous phrase as 
meaning something different than what it appeared to 
mean on its face. The court reasoned that 
 
       if Jenkins' contention is correct, United was bound to 
       continue purchasing all Jenkins' oil . . . even though 
       Jenkins failed to honor his obligation to United. . . . 
       Such an interpretation of the language of this contract 
       is both absurd and unreasonable. Under such an 
       interpretation, Jenkins could take his pr ofits from the 
       "oil runs", dishonor his obligations to United and 
       United would be bound indefinitely to the agr eement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
insolvency clause for its conclusion." Id. at 1009. While the term 
"insolvent" served as the basic contractual hook for Mellon's argument, 
there was scant further evidence in the contract itself to support 
Mellon's alternative interpretation, which in effect "made the 
[insolvency] 
condition a nullity." Id. at 1013. Such a radical re-interpretation, 
without 
evidence to support it in the actual wording of the contract, was "an 
impermissible rewriting of the words of the contract." Id. at 1008. Inour 
analysis, we differentiated between using extrinsic evidence to support 
an alternative interpretation of a ter m that sharpened its meaning 
(legitimate) and an interpretation that completely changed the meaning 
(illegitimate): "extrinsic evidence may be used to show that `Ten Dollars 
paid on January 5, 1980,' meant ten Canadian dollars, but it would not 
be allowed to show the parties meant twenty dollars." Id. at 1013. We 
thus held that there was no latent ambiguity in the contract. 
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Id. at 580. Thus, Jenkins stands for the proposition that, if 
the plain meaning of a contract term would lead to an 
interpretation that is absurd and unr easonable, 
Pennsylvania contract law allows a court to construe the 
contract otherwise in order to reach "the only sensible and 
reasonable interpretation" of the contract. Id. 
 
To summarize: a contract that is unambiguous on its 
face must be interpreted according to the natural meaning 
of its terms, unless the contract contains a latent 
ambiguity, whereupon extrinsic evidence may be admitted 
to establish the correct interpretation. However, a claim of 
latent ambiguity must be based on a "contractual hook": 
the proffered extrinsic evidence must support an alternative 
meaning of a specific term or terms contained in the 
contract, rather than simply support a general claim that 
the parties meant something other than what the contract 
says on its face. In other words, the ambiguity inquiry must 
be about the parties' "linguistic refer ence" rather than 
about their expectations. Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 614. 
Furthermore, a proffer ed alternative meaning for the 
contractual hook must be reasonable; that is, it must be 
supported by contractual evidence that goes beyond the 
party's claim that the contractual hook has a certain 
meaning, and the interpretation cannot contradict the 
standard meaning of a term when the parties could have 
easily used another term to convey this contradictory 
meaning. In determining whether latent ambiguity exists in 
a facially unambiguous contract, a court must consider 
whether the extrinsic evidence that the proponent of the 
alternative interpretation seeks to of fer is the type of 
evidence that could support a reasonable alter native 
interpretation of the contract, given the for egoing 
principles. Finally, a court can consider an alter native 
interpretation of a facially unambiguous contract term 
when the plain meaning interpretation of the contract 
would lead to an absurd and unreasonable outcome. With 
these precepts in mind, we turn to the issue before us. 
 
B. The Interpretation of the Agreement 
 
Ellwood argues that the language in the Agr eement that 
concerns rebates on purchases of steel from EUS is 
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straightforward and unambiguous. Section 2.3 of the Steel 
Purchase Agreement, which is the section covering the 
award of rebates, states that rebates shall be given if 
"Buyer's Purchases . . . constitute mor e than 80%" of EUS's 
overhead. Ellwood contends that the wor d "purchases" as 
used in this section has an accepted meaning: Black's Law 
Dictionary defines a "purchase" as the"[t]ransmission of 
property from one person to another by voluntary act and 
agreement, founded on a valuable consideration." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1110 (5th ed. 1979). There is no express 
limitation on the purpose for which the purchases can be 
made anywhere in the Agreement. Thus, Ellwood argues, 
"purchases" in S 2.3 of the Steel Purchase Agreements 
unambiguously includes all purchases, so that Ellwood 
rightfully received rebates on the steel ingots it purchased 
from EUS and immediately sold to third party customers. 
Ellwood further asserts that Uddeholm has not pr ovided a 
reasonable alternative interpretation of "purchases," so that 
the District Court should have interpreted"purchases" in 
this straightforward manner, and thus should not have 
sent the interpretation of the Agreement to the jury. See 
Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011. 
 
In contrast, Uddeholm's argument not only focuses on 
the term "Buyer's Purchases" inS 2.3 as the main 
"contractual hook" in its ambiguity ar gument, but also 
points to other provisions in the Agreement that support its 
interpretation that "Buyer's Purchases" in S 2.3 really 
means "purchases for Ellwood's/Uddeholm's own use only." 
As we noted above, this use of other provisions of the 
Agreement comports with Pennsylvania law, which provides 
that a court should look to the contract as a whole for 
guidance in interpreting a term in the contract. See 
Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 615 (finding support for the 
court's interpretation of contested ter ms by examining the 
"format, construction and terms of the contract generally"). 
 
Uddeholm first points to a provision in the Shareholders 
Agreement (which is one of the contracts that comprise the 
Agreement) stating that "[u]nless the Shareholders shall 
agree otherwise, the total steel and other alloy metal output 
of EUS shall be purchased by the Shareholders in 
accordance with such Steel Purchase Agr eements." 
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Uddeholm argues that the most natural r eading of this 
statement is that outside sales were not per mitted absent 
the consent of both parties, and that if Ellwood could 
unilaterally use the joint venture to make sales to third 
parties as it pleased while keeping 100% of the benefits, 
there never would be a reason for the parties to "agree 
otherwise" and thus change the Agreement r equirements on 
purchasing ingots. These provisions would thereby become 
meaningless, which would violate the well-established 
principle of contract construction "that a contract should 
be read so as to give meaning to all of its ter ms when read 
as an entirety." Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 
836 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania 
law, citing Monti v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 450 A.2d 24, 26 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1982)). 
 
Second, Uddeholm points to a provision of the Business 
Plan (which is incorporated into the Agreement, see supra 
at page 6) that states that ingots "shall be cast in a variety 
of shapes and weights according to the r equirements of 
Ellwood City Forge and Uddeholm Tooling AB." Uddeholm 
argues that the term "requir ements" in this provision 
impliedly refers to requirements for the internal use of 
Ellwood and Uddeholm; if the parties had intended 
otherwise, it submits, they would have used the phrase 
"according to the specifications or dered by Ellwood and 
Uddeholm," or "according to the r equirements of Ellwood, 
Uddeholm, and designated third parties."5 That is, because 
the process of making steel ingots involves casting each 
ingot to a specific shape and weight while the ingot is still 
hot (thus avoiding wasting excess steel), and because these 
specifications are determined by the ultimate end product 
into which the ingot will be forged, Uddeholm argues that 
casting ingots "according to the r equirements of Ellwood 
City Forge" means tailoring the ingot to ECF 's own forging 
process. 
 
Third, the Business Plan also states that the joint 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The latter is the phrasing that Ellwood pr oposed for the Business Plan 
during negotiations, but this proposal was r ejected by Uddeholm 
because Uddeholm made it clear that it wanted the ingot purchases 
limited to the shareholders' own use. See supra at page 6. 
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venture's purpose was "to supply high quality ingot to its 
owners, Ellwood City Forge Corporation and Uddeholm 
Tooling AB." (emphasis added) Uddeholm submits that the 
term "supply" in this clause clearly connotes a purpose to 
provide steel for Uddeholm's and Ellwood's own use in their 
steel toolmaking processes rather than for the immediate 
resale of the raw steel ingots. Uddeholm ar gues that one 
normally "supplies" raw materials to a manufacturer who 
then uses those materials himself; one does not nor mally 
"supply" raw materials to a middleman who then resells 
them. 
 
These three sections of the Agreement, along with S 2.3 of 
the Steel Purchase Agreements, are sufficient to serve as 
the required "contractual hook" in Uddeholm's ambiguity 
argument.6 Uddeholm's pr offered interpretation of these 
sections does not contradict the common meaning of the 
terms contained therein but merely narrows those 
meanings, and Uddeholm's interpretation is r easonable 
when the sections are considered together . Uddeholm's 
reading of these sections thus serves to cast doubt on 
Ellwood's claim that S 2.3 is unambiguous. Our next step is 
to examine the extrinsic evidence that Uddeholm of fers to 
support its alternative interpretation ofS 2.3.7 
 
First, Guy Asterius, the Uddeholm General Counsel, 
testified at trial that the parties discussed sales to third 
parties during the negotiations leading up to the joint 
venture, and agreed that such sales might sometimes be 
necessary, but only if both shareholders agr eed, and only in 
the marginal case. He testified that the parties understood 
that, other than in such marginal cases, the tool steel that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Ellwood points out that S 5.2 of the Steel Purchase Agreements 
(dealing with the inspection of ingots bought fr om EUS) provides that 
"[d]efects attributable to shipment fr om the Steel Mill to Buyer or 
Buyer's 
customer shall be the responsibility of the Buyer." (Emphasis added.) 
Although this language does support Ellwood's interpretation of the 
Agreement as allowing third-party sales, it is not enough to undermine 
Uddeholm's argument that other sections of the Agreement raise a 
question of ambiguity on this issue. 
 
7. As we stated earlier, our concern here is whether Uddeholm's proffered 
extrinsic evidence could be used to support a r easonable alternative 
interpretation of the Agreement. See supra note 3. 
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EUS provided was to be used only for the two shareholder's 
businesses. 
 
Other evidence showed that, after preliminary 
discussions, Ellwood sent to Asterius a proposed version of 
the Business Plan for EUS which provided that, while the 
principal purpose of EUS was to supply ingots to the 
owners, the secondary purpose was to earn the maximum 
profit "from sale of its product to third parties." The 
proposal included other references to sales by EUS to third 
parties, such as a provision that ingots shall be cast 
according to the requirements of Uddeholm, Ellwood, and 
"third party purchasers." Uddeholm was surprised over the 
inclusion of the references to thir d party sales in Ellwood's 
proposal, and it met with Ellwood in or der to clarify its 
understanding that the purpose of the joint ventur e was to 
supply ingots for Ellwood's and Uddeholm's use only. 
Thereafter, all references in the Agreement to third parties 
and third party sales were deleted, including the provision 
about the secondary purpose of EUS. Uddeholm contends 
that this evidence strongly supports the infer ence that, 
after these deletions, both parties understood that large 
volume third-party sales were not pr ovided for under the 
Agreement. 
 
Finally, Bo Jonsson, who was the President of Uddeholm 
and also sat on the EUS board of directors, stated in an 
affidavit that 
 
       During that time [1986-88] . . . I agr eed to the sale of 
       raw carbon and alloy steel ingots to third parties 
       unrelated to either Uddeholm or ECF on the basis that 
       such sales were necessary to help fill up EUS's steel 
       mill and/or optimize production. . . . I also agreed to 
       third party ingot sales because defendant Bar ensfeld 
       represented to me that there would be at least some 
       contribution received by EUS as a result of these sales; 
       i.e., that EUS would receive from these sales some 
       amount over and above the actual manufacturing cost 
       or "base cost" of the steel ingots produced for sale to 
       third parties. . . . I agreed on behalf of Uddeholm to the 
       sale of raw steel ingots to third parties, but only as a 
       temporary, short term strategy for EUS. I did not agree 
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       to open-ended, unlimited sales of raw steel ingots by 
       ECF to third parties. 
 
We are persuaded (as was the District Court) by 
Uddeholm's argument that Asterius's testimony, Jonsson's 
affidavit, and the other evidence described above strongly 
supports the inference that Uddeholm had clearly 
communicated its understanding of the allowability of third 
party sales under the Agreement to Ellwood. 8 We note 
additionally that it is a central principle of contract 
interpretation that if a party knew or had r eason to know 
of the other parties' interpretation of ter ms of a contract, 
the first party should be bound by that interpr etation. See 
Emor, Inc. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 467 F .2d 770, 775 (3d 
Cir. 1972) ("[T]he meaning given to the words by one party 
should be given effect if the other party knew or had reason 
to know that it was in fact so given.") (quoting 3 Arthur L. 
Corbin, On Contracts S 537, at 51 (1960)). Uddeholm points 
out that Ellwood was aware of Uddeholm's interpretation of 
the Agreement, while Uddeholm was unawar e of Ellwood's 
competing interpretation; Uddeholm thus submits that 
Ellwood should be bound by Uddeholm's understanding. 
Furthermore, the extrinsic evidence pr offered by Uddeholm 
concerns the parties' objectively manifested linguistic 
reference regarding certain ter ms of the contract, rather 
than merely their expectations. See Dusquesne Light Co. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 614 (3d Cir. 1995). 
We thus conclude that the extrinsic evidence that 
Uddeholm offered in support of its interpretation supports 
its reasonable alternative interpr etation of the Agreement. 
 
In sum, the evidence proffered by Uddeholm, considered 
together, supports the conclusion that the District Court 
was correct in deciding that the Agreement contained 
latently ambiguous language and thus that the pr oper 
interpretation of the Agreement was an issue for the jury to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. At trial, Ellwood objected to the District Court's admission of 
Jonsson's affidavit into evidence, and it has appealed this ruling to this 
Court. For reasons set out in Section VII.C.1 infra, we will hold that the 
District Court did not err in admitting Jonsson's affidavit under Fed. R. 
Evid. 807, and hence the use of that affidavit her e to support 
Uddeholm's ambiguity argument is proper . 
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decide. The sections of the Agreement that Uddeholm uses 
as the contractual hook for its ambiguity ar gument are 
sufficient to ground its argument, because Uddeholm offers 
a reasonable alternate interpretation of these sections that 
does not contradict but merely narrows the plain meaning 
of the disputed terms. We thus find unavailing Ellwood's 
contention that extrinsic evidence should not have been 
considered because Uddeholm's alternative interpretation of 
the Agreement was unreasonable. When the sections of the 
Agreement that Uddeholm points to are considered 
alongside the extrinsic evidence outlined above--including 
the business plan, the parties' preliminary negotiations, 
Ellwood's rejected draft, and Jonsson's affidavit--there is 
considerable evidence supporting Uddeholm's claim that 
the Agreement was intended to set up a deal under which 
the parties would buy steel from EUS for their own 
purposes only, and would sell raw steel to thir d parties only 
in rare situations. Therefore, we hold that there is sufficient 
evidence for the District Court's conclusion that the 
Agreement was ambiguous as a matter of law, and thus the 
court did not err in sending the issue of the interpretation 
of the Agreement to the jury. 
 
III. Did the District Court Err in its Jury Instructions 
by Shifting the Burden of Proof to Ellwood 
on the Breach of Contract Claim? 
 
Ellwood contends that the District Court err ed in its 
instructions to the jury by putting the burden on Ellwood 
to establish the meaning of any ambiguous ter ms in the 
Agreement. We review a jury instruction to determine 
" `whether the charge, taken as a whole and viewed in light 
of the evidence, fairly and adequately submits the issues in 
the case to the jury' and reverse `only if the instruction was 
capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.' " 
Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 
1241, 1259 n.15 (3rd Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting Link v. 
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 922 
(3d Cir. 1986)). We exercise plenary review, however, over 
whether the District Court correctly stated the legal 
standard for the burden of proof in its jury instructions. 
See United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
                                26 
  
When the District Court sent the matter of the 
interpretation of the Agreement to the jury, it stated that, 
although ordinarily a party asserting that a contract was 
breached carries the burden of proving the breach, where a 
fiduciary relationship exits the burden shifts to the 
fiduciary to prove the absence of a br each. Because the 
court found that a fiduciary relationship existed between 
Ellwood and Uddeholm, its instructions to the jury placed 
the burden on Ellwood to establish the meaning of any 
ambiguous contract terms, even though Uddeholm was the 
party asserting the breach of contract. Ellwood contends 
that the District Court erred in shifting the burden of proof 
in this manner. Since this issue concer ns the District 
Court's description of a legal standard in the jury 
instructions, our review is plenary. 
 
The court found that there was a fiduciary r elationship 
between Ellwood and Uddeholm because Ellwood was the 
majority shareholder in a joint venture. A shareholder in 
such a position is under close scrutiny, and is expected to 
conform to the highest standards of conduct. See Ferber v. 
American Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983) ("It 
has long been recognized that majority shar eholders have a 
duty to protect the interests of the minority."); Snellbaker v. 
Herrmann, 462 A.2d 713, 718 (Pa. Super . Ct. 1983) ("[A] 
joint venturer owes a duty of the utmost good faith and 
must act towards his associate with scrupulous honesty."). 
When occupying such a position, it is a breach of fiduciary 
duty to act to benefit oneself at the expense of the minority 
shareholder. See Ferber, 469 A.2d at 1050. Pennsylvania 
law shifts the burden onto the fiduciary to prove that a 
transaction is fair and not fraudulent when thefiduciary 
acts to benefit himself while in the fiduciary r ole. See 
Ruggieri v. West Forum Corp., 282 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. 1971) 
("[O]nce a fiduciary or confidential r elationship is shown to 
exist, the burden is shifted to [the fiduciary] . . . to prove 
absence of fraud, and that the transaction was fair and 
equitable."); In re Estate of Harrison , 745 A.2d 676, 682 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2000); Dresden v. W illock, 518 F.2d 281, 290 (3d 
Cir. 1975). 
 
Because Pennsylvania law shifts the burden onto 
fiduciaries to prove the fairness of a self-benefitting 
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transaction, and because Ellwood was a fiduciary as the 
majority shareholder in the joint ventur e, Uddeholm 
requested the District Court to place the bur den on Ellwood 
to establish the meaning of the disputed ter ms in the 
Agreement. The District Court acceded to this r equest, but 
it cautioned the plaintiff 's counsel that this was a risky 
move: 
 
       You know, you realize that the plaintif f takes 
       considerable risk in this case going to the jury this 
       way. And what I mean is, if the plaintiff is confident on 
       the merits of its case, this little burden shifting thing 
       which I think interests Judges and lawyers mor e than 
       it does juries because of the uncertainty in the law, 
       and we have no idea what the Court of Appeals for the 
       Third Circuit might say about this ruling, the plaintiff 
       takes considerable risk in submitting it in this fashion. 
       And it may be doing you a disservice, but inasmuch as 
       it was what you requested, or some of what you 
       requested, and because I think, in good faith, that it is 
       the law of Pennsylvania, that is the way it is going in. 
 
The District Court's trepidation about shifting the burden 
onto Ellwood here was well-founded. Although it would 
seem to comport with Pennsylvania law to put the bur den 
on a fiduciary to establish the meaning of disputed terms 
in a contract between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, we 
need not decide that issue, because Ellwood and Uddeholm 
were not in a fiduciary relationship when the Agreement 
was negotiated and executed. Ellwood's fiduciary duty to 
Uddeholm arose after the Agreement was executed: the 
Agreement created the joint ventur e, which itself then gave 
rise to the fiduciary relationship. See Snellbaker, 462 A.2d 
at 716 ("The rights, duties, and obligations of joint 
venturers, as between themselves, depend primarily upon 
the terms of the contract by which they assume the 
relationship."); see also In Re Estate of Clark, 359 A.2d 777, 
781 (Pa. 1976) (stating that it is "well-settled" that if a party 
contesting a gift shows that a confidential orfiduciary 
relationship between the donor and donee existed at the 
time of the gift, the burden then shifts to the donee to show 
that the gift was free of any taint of undue influence or 
deception); Weisbecker v. Hosiery Patents, Inc., 51 A.2d 
 
                                28 
  
811, 813-14 (Pa. 1947) (fiduciary duty to a minority 
shareholder arises as a result of being a majority 
shareholder). 
 
Although an asymmetry in power did arise between these 
parties after the Agreement was signed, no such asymmetry 
existed when the parties were hammering out its disputed 
and ambiguous terms, as the parties wer e not then in a 
majority-minority shareholder relationship in a joint 
venture. Thus, the reason for placing the burden of proof 
on a fiduciary in breach of contract cases--the fiduciary is 
in a position of control over the beneficiary or his property, 
and must therefore meet a higher standar d in his dealings 
with the beneficiary--does not apply to this case. See 
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 
F.3d 409, 421 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that a fiduciary has 
the burden of proof to explain a transaction which benefits 
himself at the expense of his beneficiaries because a 
"suspicion naturally arises that the fiduciary has gained by 
taking advantage of its special relationship"); Ferber, 469 
A.2d at 1050 (stating that a majority shareholder's fiduciary 
duty to minority shareholder prevents him from using his 
power as a majority shareholder to deprive minority of a 
proper share of the benefits from the enterprise). While it 
makes perfect sense to place the burden on a fiduciary to 
explain business actions which benefitted itself over its 
beneficiary, the same logic does not hold for a br each of 
contract when there are dueling interpr etations of the 
contract entered into at arms length by sophisticated 
corporations who are not in any kind of fiduciary 
relationship at the time the contract is for med. 
 
Uddeholm cites no cases in which a fiduciary r elationship 
that was created by a contract caused a court to shift the 
burden of proof on the interpretation of that contract. All of 
the cases Uddeholm cites in support of its position shift the 
burden of proof onto the fiduciary because, at the time the 
questionable transaction was consummated by the 
defendant, the defendant already had an unequal or 
fiduciary relationship with the plaintif f. See, e.g., 
Weisbecker, 51 A.2d at 813-14; Snellbaker, 462 A.2d at 
716; Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 421; Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 
120, 125-27 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff 'd  510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 
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1975). Because it is hornbook law that (when no fiduciary 
relationship exists) the party alleging a br each of contract 
bears the burden of proving the elements of a breach of 
contract, the District Court should have placed the burden 
of proving the meaning of ambiguous ter ms in the 
Agreement on Uddeholm, not Ellwood. See In re Estate of 
Dixon, 233 A.2d 242, 244 (Pa. 1967) ("In any contract 
action, . . . the claimant bears the burden of proving the 
terms of the contract." ). Uddeholm does not assert, nor 
could it credibly, that this burden-shifting error was 
harmless. Therefore, the jury ver dict on this claim must be 
set aside, and the case remanded for a new trial.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Ellwood maintains that several of the District Court's other 
instructions to the jury were in error as well. First, Ellwood contends 
that the court erred in giving an instruction that "[t]here is no dispute 
that ECF and Uddeholm formed a venture . . . from which both parties 
would share the benefits." Ellwood asserts that this was tantamount to 
directing a verdict for Uddeholm. W e find no merit in this contention. 
Whether EUS was a "cost center" (as Ellwood contends) or a "profit 
center" (as Ellwood denies), the purpose of the Agreement was to benefit 
both sides, thus the "share the benefits" instruction left room for the 
two 
parties to present their varying theories on the way in which the benefits 
were to be shared. The "share the benefits" instruction, taken in the 
context of the jury instruction as a whole and viewed in light of the 
evidence, fairly submitted the issues to the jury and was not particularly 
liable to confuse or mislead the jury. See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
This contention is therefore without merit. 
 
Ellwood also argues that the District Court erred by failing to include 
the following four matters in its jury instructions: (1) an identification 
of 
the specific disputed language from the Agr eement along with the 
parties' competing interpretations of that language; (2) a description of 
the relevant evidentiary and contract interpr etation principles; (3) an 
instruction on the proximate cause requir ement for measuring damages 
for a breach of a covenant not to compete; and (4) an instruction that 
the jury was to decide whether a type of steel that Ellwood produced 
after the joint venture ended (the "420 series" of steel) was generally 
regarded as "tool steel." We review a district court's decision not to 
include a party's proffered jury instruction for abuse of discretion. See 
United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 1999); Limbach, 949 
F.2d at 1259 n.15 ("Failure to instruct the jury as requested does not 
constitute error so long as the instruction, taken as a whole, properly 
apprises the jury of the issues and the applicable law.") None of these 
omissions rise to the level of reversible err or. 
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IV. Did the District Court Err in Allowing a Separate 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Ellwood? 
 
The District Court allowed the jury to consider a separate 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against Ellwood for behavior 
that Ellwood contends was covered by the Agr eement and 
hence was subsumed in the jury charge (and ver dict) for 
breach of contract. Ellwood submits that Uddeholm pressed 
this tort claim simply to circumvent the unavailability of 
punitive damages for contract claims under Pennsylvania 
law. The issue of whether the fiduciary duty claim is 
allowable here is a question of law over which our review is 
plenary. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Pennsylvania courts use two methods to deter mine 
whether tort claims that accompany contract claims should 
be allowed as freestanding causes of action or rejected as 
illegitimate attempts to procure additional damages for a 
breach of contract: the "gist of the action" test and the 
"economic loss doctrine" test.10  Under the "gist of the 
action" test, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The District Court's instructions directed the jury to interpret certain 
sections of the Agreement. There is no authority to support Ellwood's 
claim that the court had to point out specific ter ms in the Agreement 
that were the focus of the ambiguity dispute, especially when 
Uddeholm's position was that the terms wer e ambiguous in the context 
of the Agreement as a whole. Furthermor e, the record supports the 
conclusion that the court adequately instructed the jury on the relevant 
legal principles. Ellwood's claim that the District Court did not 
adequately instruct the jury on the proximate cause requirement for 
damages is plainly lacking in merit when portions of the court's 
instructions not mentioned by Ellwood are considered, as it is clear that 
the court's full jury instruction properly apprised the jury of the 
relevant 
law. Finally, the record is clear that the District Court's decision to 
omit 
an instruction concerning the jury's r ole in deciding whether the "420 
series" was generally regarded as "tool steel" was based on the court's 
concern for jury confusion. In our view, this decision was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
 
10. While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has neither accepted nor 
rejected the economic-loss doctrine, Pennsylvania intermediate appellate 
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       to be construed as a tort action, the [tortious] wrong 
       ascribed to the defendant must be the gist of the action 
       with the contract being collateral. . . . [T]he important 
       difference between contract and tort actions is that the 
       latter lie from the breach of duties imposed as a matter 
       of social policy while the former lie for the breach of 
       duties imposed by mutual consensus. 
 
Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Inter national Ins. 
Co., 685 A.2d 581, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (en banc) 
(quoting Phico Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Med. Servs. Corp., 
663 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). In other words, 
a claim should be limited to a contract claim when"the 
parties' obligations are defined by the ter ms of the 
contracts, and not by the larger social policies embodied in 
the law of torts." Bash v. Bell Telephone Co., 601 A.2d 825, 
830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 
This Court described the "economic-loss doctrine" test in 
Duquesne Light as "prohibit[ing] plaintiffs from recovering 
in tort economic losses to which their entitlementflows only 
from a contract." 66 F.3d at 618. Duquesne Light explained 
further that a plaintiff should be limited to a contract claim 
"when loss of the benefit of a bargain is the plaintiff 's sole 
loss." Id. (quotations marks omitted). Both parties argue 
that both tests support their positions. For the r easons set 
forth in the margin, we focus primarily on the"gist of the 
action" test.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
courts have applied the doctrine, see, e.g., REM Coal Co., Inc. v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), and this Court has 
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the version 
of the economic loss doctrine that the United States Supreme Court 
developed in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 
858 (1986), see King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F .2d 1047, 1053-54 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
11. The application of the economic-loss doctrine to the instant case does 
not quite fit because that doctrine developed in the context of courts' 
precluding products liability tort claims in cases where one party 
contracts for a product from another party and the product 
malfunctions, injuring only the product itself. See East River S.S. Corp. 
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-71 (1986); Duquesne 
Light, 66 F.3d at 618-20. The "gist-of-the-action" test is a better fit 
for 
this non-products liability case. 
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Ellwood contends that the Agreement was exhaustively 
negotiated and completely defined the parties' r elationship 
and obligations, so that Uddeholm's alleged losses arose 
only from alleged breaches of the Agr eement. Ellwood 
asserts that, far from being "collateral" to the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim, see Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria 
County, 685 A.2d at 590, the Agreement was"the only 
articulated predicate" for that claim. Appellants' Br. at 46. 
Conversely, Uddeholm contends that Ellwood's r ebate 
claims for third-party sales and its covering up of these 
sales breached its fiduciary duty to Uddeholm, because 
such actions involved Ellwood utilizing the joint venture for 
its own gain to the detriment of its minority partner. 
Uddeholm claims that these actions by Ellwood caused 
losses that went beyond the scope of the Agr eement, thus 
giving rise to a cause of action separate fr om the breach of 
contract claim. Uddeholm contends further that, because 
the existence of a contract between two parties does not 
preclude one of the parties from r ecovering in tort for a 
breached fiduciary duty, it should be allowed to recover for 
Ellwood's breached fiduciary duty in this case. See Valley 
Forge Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Visitor's Servs., Inc., 
28 F. Supp. 2d 947, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("That a plaintiff 
may not sue in tort for economic losses arising fr om a 
breach of contract, however, does not pr eclude the 
possibility of a tort action between parties to a contract.") 
(applying Pennsylvania law); see also United Int'l Holdings, 
Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F .3d 1207, 1226-27 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that, under Colorado law, a breach of 
fiduciary duty that arises from the parties' status as joint 
venturers is independent of the contract that created the 
joint venture, thus the economic loss doctrine does not bar 
such a fiduciary duty claim). 
 
As we explained earlier, there was afiduciary relationship 
between Ellwood and Uddeholm because Ellwood was the 
majority shareholder in a joint venture and had sole and 
virtually exclusive control over the object of the venture 
(i.e., EUS). Pennsylvania law imposes such a fiduciary duty 
on joint venturers, see Snellbaker v. Herr mann, 462 A.2d 
713, 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), as well as on majority 
shareholders in their dealings with minority shareholders, 
see Ferber v. American Lamp Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 
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(Pa. 1983). This duty imposed obligations on Ellwood that 
went well beyond the particular obligations contained in the 
Agreement itself. See Snellbaker, 462 A.2d at 718 (stating 
that a fiduciary duty includes the duty to act toward one's 
joint venturer in the utmost good faith and with scrupulous 
honesty); Ferber, 469 A.2d at 1050 (noting that a fiduciary 
duty prevents majority shareholder fr om "using their power 
in such a way as to exclude the minority from their proper 
share of the benefits accruing from the enterprise," so that, 
when a majority shareholder acts in its own interest, this 
action "must be also in the best interest of all shareholders 
and the corporation") (emphasis omitted). 
 
As suggested by the foregoing, the obligations that 
Uddeholm alleges Ellwood breached in its fiduciary duty 
claim were imposed "as a matter of social policy" rather 
than "by mutual consensus." See Redevelopment Auth. of 
Cambria County, 685 A.2d at 590. That is, "the larger social 
policies embodied in the law of torts" rather than "the terms 
of the contract," are what underlie Uddeholm's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim. Bash, 601 A.2d at 830. The "larger 
social policy" that defines Uddeholm's claim is the policy 
requiring fair dealing and solicitude fr om a majority 
shareholder to minority shareholders in a joint venture. See 
Snellbaker, 462 A.2d at 718; Ferber, 469 A.2d at 1050; 
William Goldstein Co. v. Joseph J. & Reynold H. Greenberg, 
Inc., 42 A.2d 551, 555 (Pa. 1945) (citing Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). W e thus conclude 
that Uddeholm's fiduciary duty claim meets the"gist of the 
action" test: the tort wrong ascribed to Ellwood is the gist 
of the fiduciary duty action while the Agr eement is collateral.12 
See Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County, 685 A.2d at 
590. We therefore find no err or in the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Furthermore, while it is a closer question, we also believe that 
Uddeholm's fiduciary duty claim passes the "economic-loss doctrine" 
test. Because Uddeholm asserted that Ellwood took advantage of its 
position as a fiduciary to Uddeholm's detriment, the harm Uddeholm 
claimed to have suffered goes beyond the Agreement and the benefits 
Uddeholm was supposed to receive under the Agr eement. See Duquesne 
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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decision to allow the jury to consider a separate br each of 
fiduciary duty charge against Ellwood.13 
 
V. Did the District Court Err in Allowing a 
Separate Misappropriation of Trade Secr ets Charge 
Against Ellwood? 
 
The District Court allowed the jury to consider a 
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential 
information claim against Ellwood, but Ellwood argues that 
the relationship regarding trade secr ets was covered by: (1) 
the license to use Uddeholm's know-how, and (2) the 
covenant not to compete contained in the Know-How 
Agreement section of the Agreement. Ellwood thus argues 
that the separate misappropriation claim was subsumed in 
the charge and verdict for breach of the covenant not to 
compete. Under this view, Uddeholm's misappr opriation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Ellwood also asserts that the District Court erred in holding that 
David Barensfeld, a director and officer of both Ellwood and EUS, could 
be individually liable to Uddeholm for breach of fiduciary duty. (Ellwood 
states that this is an issue of whether Uddeholm had standing to sue 
Barensfeld, but we believe that this claim is not about Uddeholm's 
standing but about whether Uddeholm has a viable claim against 
Barensfeld.) This issue arises because the jury also awarded Uddeholm 
$70,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages 
for a breach of fiduciary duty by Bar ensfeld. Ellwood argues that, under 
Pennsylvania law, a director's fiduciary duty runs only to the corporation 
and not directly to a shareholder like Uddeholm. A shareholder can 
enforce this duty only in the name of the corporation via a derivative 
action. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 1712, 1717. Uddeholm, however, 
presented evidence that Barensfeld personally manipulated rebates, 
manipulated books and records, failed to disclose the effect of ingot 
sales, misrepresented the book value of EUS, and misappropriated 
confidential trade secrets. Under Pennsylvania law, "an officer of a 
corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort by the 
corporation is personally liable" for the tortious activity. Wicks v. 
Milzoco 
Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. 1983). The harmed party then can 
sue the officer directly. See id. The above alleged activities by 
Barensfeld 
constitute taking part in Ellwood's breach offiduciary duty. Therefore, 
Uddeholm had a viable claim against Barensfeld individually for his part 
in Ellwood's breach of its fiduciary duty, and we find no error in the 
District Court's instruction to the jury to consider whether Barensfeld 
violated a fiduciary duty to Uddeholm. 
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claim is really a claim that Ellwood's use of Uddeholm's 
know-how went beyond the Agreement's ter ms. The same 
two tests described in Section IV supra--the "gist of the 
action" test and the "economic loss doctrine" test--apply 
here for determining whether this tort claim should be 
allowed as its own claim or rejected as cover ed by the 
contract claim. See Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County 
v. International Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 581, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1996) (en banc); Duquesne Light Co. v. W estinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995). As in Section IV, we 
will primarily focus on the "gist of the action" test, see 
supra note 11. This issue involves a question of law subject 
to plenary review. See Duquesne Light, 66 F.3d at 618. 
 
Uddeholm argues that its misappropriation of trade 
secrets claim is separate and independent fr om its breach 
of contract claim in the following way: 
 
       Appellants had no `license' to misappropriate 
       Uddeholm's trade secrets and confidential information, 
       especially during the three year noncompete period. 
       Appellants violated the noncompete covenants and 
       cannot now claim them as a `license' to do the very 
       thing they were contractually prohibited from doing. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 66. The key is the last part of that 
passage; Uddeholm admits that Ellwood was "contractually 
prohibited from doing" the actions that Uddeholm contends 
form the basis of its misappropriation claim. But if this is 
the case, then "the parties' obligations ar e defined by the 
terms of the contract, and not by the lar ger social policies 
embodied in the law of torts." Bash v. Bell T elephone Co., 
601 A.2d 835, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (outlining the gist 
of the action test). That is, Uddeholm admits in its own 
argument that the Know-How Agreement covers Ellwood's 
misappropriation of its know-how (the agr eement 
"contractually prohibited" the misr epresentation), so the 
"gist" of Uddeholm's misappropriation action is actually 
breach of contract, at least as far as the use of Uddeholm's 
know-how is concerned. Thus, if the jury's ver dict for 
Uddeholm on the misappropriation of trade secr ets and 
confidential information claim was based on Ellwood's 
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misappropriation of Uddeholm's know-how, the verdict 
cannot stand.14 
 
However, Uddeholm argues further that, even if Ellwood's 
use and misuse of Uddeholm's know-how was covered by 
the Agreement, Ellwood's misappropriation of Uddeholm's 
client lists, pricing information, ship-to lists and customer 
profiles was sufficient to sustain the ver dict of 
misappropriation, since that information is confidential 
information and/or a trade secret but is not covered by the 
Know-How Agreement. Section 1.02 of the Know-How 
Agreement defines "Know-How" as "information (including 
rights under patents and license agreements, if any) 
proprietary to Licensor [Uddeholm] and useful in the 
manufacture and fabrication of Products." "Products" is in 
turn defined in S 1.03 as "carbon, alloy, tool, stainless and 
other specialty steel ingots." Section 1.02 also states that 
"Know-How" includes, but is not limited to, technical and 
engineering data and information on the manufacture and 
production of alloy, tool, stainless, and other specialty steel 
ingots. 
 
It is clear from our parsing of SS 1.02 & 1.03 that less 
technical information like client lists and pr ofiles, pricing 
information, and shipping-to information are not included 
in the coverage of the Know-How Agreement. Pennsylvania 
law is also clear that this kind of information can be a 
trade secret. See Robinson Elec. Supervisory Co. v. Johnson, 
154 A.2d 494, 496 (Pa. 1959) ("[C]ustomer lists and 
customer information . . . [are] highly confidential and 
constitute[ ] a valuable asset. Such data has been held to 
be property in the nature of a `trade secret' for which an 
employer is entitled to protection, independent of a non- 
disclosure contract."); A.M. Skier Agency, Inc. v. Gold, 747 
A.2d 936, 940 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (quoting above passage 
from Johnson). Therefore, Uddeholm is correct that, if the 
jury's verdict on this claim was based on Ellwood's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We reach a similar conclusion under the "economic loss doctrine" 
test, because Uddeholm's entitlement to economic losses from the 
misappropriation of its know-how flows only from the Agreement and not 
from tort. See Duquesne Light Co. v. W estinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 
604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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misappropriation of this latter type of confidential 
information rather than on misappropriation of know-how, 
then the verdict is sustainable because it passes the gist of 
the action and economic loss doctrine tests. 
 
The problem with Uddeholm's argument her e is that, in 
its jury instructions, the District Court did not distinguish 
between the misappropriation of know-how and the 
misappropriation of these other types of confidential 
information. The jury's special verdict also did not 
distinguish between these two categories of 
misappropriation. Thus, we cannot deter mine whether the 
jury's verdict on the misappropriation claim was properly 
grounded on actions outside the scope of the Agreement. 
We therefore will set aside the ver dict for Uddeholm on the 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim, and remand for a 
determination of this claim based solely on the 
misappropriation of trade secrets that do not include the 
know-how covered by the Know-How Agreement. 
 
VI. Ellwood's Challenge to the Civil Conspiracy Award 
 
The jury awarded Uddeholm $70,000 in punitive 
damages on its civil conspiracy claim against Ellwood. 
Uddeholm's complaint averred that Ellwood conspired with 
the Ellwood Specialty Steel Company, Ellwood Quality Steel 
Company, Bjorn Gabrielson, and David Bar ensfeld to 
misappropriate its trade secrets and confidential 
information. The jury found Ellwood liable on the 
conspiracy claim but found in favor of all the r emaining 
conspiracy defendants (except Gabrielson, who had already 
been granted judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 50), which means that the jury found only one 
defendant liable for conspiracy. Ellwood challenges this 
verdict on the grounds that under Pennsylvania law, civil 
conspiracy requires at least two co-conspirators. See 
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 473 (Pa. 
1979). 
 
Uddeholm does not dispute that two conspirators ar e 
required under Pennsylvania law, and that, if this issue 
had been preserved in the District Court, the conspiracy 
verdict would have to be set aside. Instead, Uddeholm 
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argues that this issue was waived because Ellwood did not 
clearly object on this basis at trial.15  See Medical Protective 
Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 105 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999). After 
the verdict, the District Court asked the parties if they 
wished to raise any objections to the verdict, and the court 
noted specifically that there appeared to be only one 
conspirator. The court's colloquy with the parties on this 
issue consisted solely of the following: 
 
       COURT: Civil conspiracy, I think they only found one 
       defendant. 
 
       SOMMER (counsel for Ellwood): I believe that's corr ect, 
       Your honor, just EGI. 
 
       MARTIN (counsel for Uddeholm): Yes. 
 
       COURT: That's a difficult undertaking. I would think 
       that it would require two or more. 
 
       MARTIN: I don't think the other defendant was joined, 
       though, and that was Mr. Sundvall, when he was out 
       at Avesta, because EGI was the defendant in the case. 
 
       COURT: That's correct, you did ar gue that he was a co- 
       conspirator. Is there anything else in there that pops 
       out at you as being inconsistent? 
 
Although Uddeholm argued that Sundvall could serve as 
the other co-conspirator, Sundvall had been previously 
granted summary judgment on all claims against him, 
including civil conspiracy. The issue here, then, is whether 
Ellwood waived its argument that it could not be the only 
party liable for civil conspiracy by neglecting to assert that 
objection at trial. Ellwood argues that it objected by 
agreeing with the District Court when the court raised the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Uddeholm argues in the alternative that, since we can affirm the 
conspiracy verdict if it has any rational basis, we should do so because 
of the possibility that the jury could have concluded that one Robert 
Raubolt served as the other co-conspirator. This argument is without 
merit. Uddeholm did not even mention Raubolt as a possible co- 
conspirator at trial, and raised this possibility for the first time in 
its 
reply brief. We will not reach this contention because Uddeholm waived 
this argument by not raising it in his opening brief. See Ghana v. 
Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir . 2000). 
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problem with the conspiracy verdict. Ellwood contends that 
it should not be required to do mor e when the District 
Court itself raises the objection. 
 
Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedur e states 
that a party need not make a formal exception to a ruling 
or order of a court, but instead "it is sufficient that a party, 
at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which the 
party desires the court to take or the party's objection to 
the action of the court and the grounds ther efor." On the 
other hand, " `[i]t is well established that failure to raise an 
issue in the district court constitutes a waiver of the 
argument.' " Medical Protective Co., 198 F.3d at 105 n.3 
(quoting Brenner v. Local 514, United Br otherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F .2d 1283, 1298 
(3d Cir. 1991)). 
 
Although this issue is close, we are satisfied that Ellwood 
did not waive its argument that it could not be liable as the 
sole conspirator. It is true that Ellwood should have done 
more than merely agree with the District Court when the 
court noted the problem with the conspiracy ver dict. But 
passivity may be excusable when the District Court itself 
identifies the issue not only as problematic but as almost 
certain grounds for setting aside the ver dict. It would be 
unfair to Ellwood to penalize it for failing to jump up and 
down or labor an objection that the District Court had 
placed in the record. Therefor e, we hold that the verdict 
against Ellwood for civil conspiracy must be set aside, and 
that judgment must be entered for Ellwood on this claim. 
 
VII. Other Challenges to Trial Rulings 
 
A. Should Uddeholm Have Been Allowed to Recover 
Damages for 1991 Rebates? 
 
On Uddeholm's breach of contract claim, the jury 
awarded compensatory damages for Ellwood's impr oper 
calculation of rebates under S 2.3 of the Steel Purchase 
Agreements. The parties agree that this amount included 
damages for Ellwood's 1991 rebates on steel pur chases 
from EUS. Ellwood contends that, even if Uddeholm is 
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entitled to rebate damages generally, it is not entitled to 
any damages for post-1990 rebates, because Ellwood was 
entitled to buy out Uddeholm's share of EUS at EUS's book 
value as of December 31, 1990, and in fact Ellwood 
initiated these buy-out proceedings. Ellwood ar gues that 
the original Shareholders Agreement is quite clear that the 
buy-out price for Uddeholm's shares of EUS was to be the 
book value of EUS as of the month preceding the buy-out 
notice, which Ellwood gave in January 1991. Because the 
buy-out price was fixed prior to the 1991 r ebates, Ellwood 
submits that these rebates could not have af fected the 
value of Uddeholm's shares at the buy-out, and thus 
Uddeholm was not entitled to damages for the 1991 
rebates. 
 
When Ellwood sought post-trial relief on this point, the 
District Court denied Ellwood's motion, ruling that the 
money the jury seemingly awarded for the 1991 r ebates 
was really for Ellwood's breach of the Agr eement in 
rejecting Uddeholm's tender of its EUS shar es after Ellwood 
initiated the buy-out. The Agreement stipulates that the 
settlement of the sale of Uddeholm's stock to Ellwood 
should take place as soon as is practicable after the 
decision is made, and in any event within 30 days after 
determination of the purchase price. Ellwood, however, 
never paid for Uddeholm's stock and in fact r ejected 
Uddeholm's tender of stock. This action delayed the 
settlement of the buy-out, and thus extended the time that 
Uddeholm had to pay overhead for EUS well into 1991. 
Since the Agreement is silent on what is to happen in such 
a situation, the District Court found (post-trial) that the 
contract was ambiguous on this point. The court ther efore 
ruled that it had been the jury's province to decide on the 
proper remedy for this breach by Ellwood, and that the jury 
had decided to award the amount of the 1991 r ebates as 
damages. 
 
Ellwood raises two basic challenges to this ruling. First, 
it argues that the Agreement is not ambiguous on this 
issue: the Shareholders Agreement unambiguously fixes 
book value for buy-out purposes at the sending of buy-out 
notice, and there is no provision in the Agreement to vary 
this. Second, Ellwood contends that the jury was not 
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instructed on the issue of the ambiguity of the Agr eement 
concerning a rejection of a share tender, nor did it return 
any kind of verdict on this issue in its special verdict. 
Ellwood thus argues that the award of the 1991 rebate 
damages cannot stand on the District Court's theory, 
because "[a] verdict cannot stand on a theory that the jury 
was never asked to consider." Appellants' Br. at 59. 
 
Ellwood's argument that the Agreement was 
unambiguous on this issue is unavailing. Ellwood is correct 
that the Agreement clearly sets out the method for 
calculating the stock purchase price (i.e., EUS's book value) 
in a buy-out, but it is just as clear in the Agr eement that 
the settlement of such a buy-out was to take place no later 
than 30 days after the determination of the purchase price. 
The settlement did not occur within the time period set by 
the Agreement, and there is no provision in the Agreement 
that provides for such a circumstance. It is simply not true 
that the Agreement unambiguously gives Ellwood the right 
to initiate the buy-out, set the purchase price for the stock, 
and then drag its heels for an indefinite time on the 
settlement of the buy-out while keeping the pur chase price 
for the buy-out fixed--all the while collecting overhead 
costs from Uddeholm for EUS. Moreover , such an 
interpretation of the Agreement would be"absurd and 
unreasonable," so we will not interpr et the Agreement in 
this manner. See United Refining Co. v. Jenkins, 189 A.2d 
574, 580 (Pa. 1963). The District Court rightly concluded 
that the Agreement was ambiguous as to what should have 
occurred upon Ellwood's rejection of Uddeholm's tender, 
making this question an issue for the jury to consider. 
 
As for Ellwood's contention that the District Court 
improperly attributed a rationale for the jury's verdict using 
a theory that the jury was never asked to consider , we need 
not decide this issue because we will set aside the jury's 
award on the breach of contract claim on other grounds 
(i.e., the burden-shifting error; see Section III supra). On 
remand, the District Court should instruct the jury on the 
issue of the ambiguity of the Agreement concer ning a 
rejection of the share tender, so that the jury can explicitly 
decide whether Ellwood breached the Agr eement by 
rejecting Uddeholm's tender, and whether the 1991 rebates 
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should be included in the damage award as a r emedy for 
this breach. 
 
B. The Interest Rate That Should Be Applied to Post- 
Venture Sales of Steel. 
 
After the joint venture between Uddeholm and Ellwood 
dissipated, Uddeholm bought approximately $345,000 
worth of steel from Ellwood. Both parties agr ee that 
Uddeholm still owes Ellwood this $345,000 plus inter est; 
this amount is to be set off against the money Ellwood will 
owe Uddeholm on the claims in this lawsuit. The parties 
disagree, however, over the rate of interest that should be 
applied to this debt. In a post-verdict motion to the District 
Court, Ellwood argued that the 18% inter est rate that it 
charges all of its customers should be applied to the 
$345,000 and compounded semi-annually, as that rate was 
included in the terms and conditions that wer e attached to 
the invoice order form used for these steel purchases. 
Uddeholm counters that the statutory 6% rate should be 
applied because the agreement for this steel was part of a 
general commercial agreement that did not involve 
Ellwood's standard terms. 
 
In its September 13, 1999 Memorandum Order on Post- 
Trial Matters, the District Court found that the steel was 
purchased via an agreement "which was not confined to the 
terms included on the backs of the related invoices, [ ] 
which is where defendants find the pr ovision for the high 
rate of interest they seek." Dist. Ct. Mem. Order, Sept. 13, 
1999 at 3. The court based this conclusion partially on 
evidence presented by Uddeholm that the parties entered 
into a commercial agreement with dif ferent terms from 
Ellwood's standard agreement, and partially on its 
conclusion that it would be "logical" for these parties not to 
confine their commercial dealings to the ter ms on the back 
of a form invoice, given that they had worked together for 
years as joint venturers. The District Court also reasoned 
that the 6% rate would be "otherwise fair ," as the 6% rate 
applied to all the debts that Ellwood owed Uddeholm. The 
court thus applied the 6% statutory rate. 
 
Although the District Court determination that the post- 
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venture steel sales agreement did not include the 18% 
invoice slip rate may be the best interpretation of the 
evidence adduced at trial, we cannot adequately r eview this 
determination because the District Court neither cited to 
nor described the evidence on which its decision was based. 
Moreover, if Ellwood sent the invoice slips within a 
reasonable time as a "definite and seasonable expression of 
acceptance or a written confirmation" of an oral agreement 
between the parties, then 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2207 (part of 
Pennsylvania's version of the UCC) would apply, and the 
terms on that invoice would become part of the agreement 
unless Uddeholm's original offer expressly limited 
acceptance to the terms of the offer , the invoice's terms 
materially altered the original terms, or Uddeholm objected 
to the new terms within a reasonable time. See 13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 2207(a) & (b).16 
 
However, there is not sufficient evidence in the District 
Court's Memorandum Order or in the recor d for us to 
review the District Court's determination on this issue-- 
indeed, it is not even clear that the District Court 
considered the applicability of S 2207 at all. Furthermore, 
the District Court's conclusion that it would be"logical" for 
the parties to have worked out their own deal separate from 
the terms on the invoice and that the 6% rate would be 
"fair" is insufficient to establish that there was such a deal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Tile 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 2207(a) & (b) provides that 
 
       (a) General rule.--A definite and seasonable expression of 
       acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a 
       reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states 
       terms additional to or different fr om those offered or agreed 
upon, 
       unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the 
       additional or different terms. 
 
       (b) Effect on contract.--The additional ter ms are to be construed 
as 
       proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such 
       terms become part of the contract unless: 
 
       (1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; 
 
       (2) they materially alter it; or 
 
       (3) notification of objection to them has alr eady been given or is 
       given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
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We therefore will vacate the District Court's order on this 
issue and remand so that the District Court can more 
specifically collect and cite evidence on the post-venture 
steel sales agreement between the parties in or der to show 
either that the 18% interest rate included in the invoice's 
terms did not become part of this agreement, or that the 
18% rate was part of the agreement. 
 
C. Evidentiary Challenges. 
 
Ellwood also challenges two evidentiary rulings that the 
District Court made at trial. We review the District Court's 
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Walden v. 
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 517 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
1. The Jonsson affidavit 
 
The District Court admitted into evidence portions of an 
affidavit of Bo Jonsson, a former Pr esident of Uddeholm, 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the catchall exception 
to the hearsay rule. Jonsson attested to the affidavit in 
1994 and died in 1996, before the trial. Uddeholm used the 
affidavit to counter assertions by Ellwood about what 
transpired at certain directors meetings that Jonsson 
attended in a representative capacity for Uddeholm. Rule 
807 provides that 
 
       [a] statement not specifically cover ed by Rule 803 or 
       804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
       trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if 
       the court determines that (A) the statement is offered 
       as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more 
       probative on the point for which it is of fered than any 
       other evidence which the proponent can pr ocure 
       through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
       purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will 
       best be served by admission of the statement into 
       evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted 
       under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
       known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of 
       the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a 
       fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's 
       intention to offer the statement and the particulars of 
       it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
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Fed. R. Evid. 807. 
 
Ellwood argues that the District Court's admission of the 
Jonsson affidavit under Rule 807 was error , because Rule 
807 is meant to be used only in the rare case, which, it 
argues, this is not. See United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 
341, 347 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that the r esidual hearsay 
exception is "to be used only rarely, and in exceptional 
circumstances," and is meant to "apply only when certain 
exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when 
high degrees of probativeness and necessity are present").17 
Specifically, Ellwood takes issue with the District Court's 
findings that the Jonsson affidavit was exceptionally 
trustworthy and that it was more probative than any other 
evidence that Uddeholm could present. 
 
While Ellwood is correct that Rule 807 should only be 
used in rare situations, the District Court made careful and 
extensive findings in support of its conclusion that this was 
such a situation. See Tr. of Jury Trial, March 24, 1999. 
First, the District Court ascertained that the r equirements 
of Rule 807 were met. The court specifically found that 
 
       - the affidavit was offered as evidence on a material 
       fact, namely the parties' course of dealings, which 
       bears upon the interpretation of the Agr eement; 
 
       - the affidavit was more probative on the point for 
       which it is offered than any other evidence which 
       the proponent could procure thr ough reasonable 
       efforts: it was highly probative because Jonsson was 
       the only representative of Uddeholm on the EUS 
       board of directors at the time in question, and, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Before 1997, the residual hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were contained in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). In 1997 the 
Rules were amended and these two residual exceptions were combined 
and transferred to the new Rule 807. "This was done to facilitate 
additions to Rules 803 and 804. No change in meaning is intended." Fed. 
R. Evid. 807 advisory committee's note. Bailey  addressed the old 
residual hearsay exceptions contained in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), 
but because Rule 807 is simply the combination of these rules, Bailey's 
holding applies to the current Rule 807 as well. The same is true of 
other pre-1997 cases on the residual hearsay exceptions that are cited 
in this Section. 
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       such, this evidence was the only evidence that 
       Uddeholm could present to counter the Ellwood's 
       allegation that Uddeholm understood the Agreement 
       to permit sales to third parties and r eimbursement 
       for those sales; 
 
       - the general purpose of the rules, fair ness and the 
       administration of justice, would be served by 
       admitting the affidavit, because it would assist the 
       jury in determining the truth; 
 
       - there was sufficient notice to Ellwood that it would 
       be used, as Uddeholm proffered the affidavit months 
       prior to trial, and there was argument and briefs 
       filed on the issue. 
 
The District Court found that the following factors also 
militated in favor of admitting the Jonsson affidavit: 
 
       - Ellwood had ways to rebut the affidavit: its 
       witnesses were present at the meetings discussed 
       therein, and these witnesses could present their 
       testimony, while Uddeholm's only witness to these 
       meetings (Jonsson) was dead; 
 
       - the affidavit was trustworthy because: (1) the 
       declarant was known and named, (2) the statement 
       was made under oath and penalty of perjury, (3) the 
       declarant "was aware of the pending litigation at the 
       time he made the declaration and thus knew that 
       his assertions were subject to cross examination," 
       (4) the statements were based on personal 
       observation, (5) the declarant was not employed by 
       the plaintiff at the time of the statements, and thus 
       had no financial interest in the litigation's outcome, 
       (6) the affidavit was corroborated, partially, by 
       minutes of directors meetings (some statements 
       Jonsson said were made match others' notations), 
       and (7) his position and background qualified him to 
       make the assertions. 
 
The District Court then acknowledged that Rule 807 
should only be used sparingly, but opined that this affidavit 
presented "a rather unique combination of circumstances 
where a material fact can be proved only through one 
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method, or, in this case, rebutted by only one method." The 
court was also swayed by the fact that it was Ellwood that 
first argued that Uddeholm knew of Ellwood's interpretation 
of the Agreement because Jonsson must have gained this 
knowledge at the directors meetings; the only way 
Uddeholm could rebut this claim was via Jonsson's 
affidavit, given that he was not available to testify. 
 
These findings are sufficient for us to hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted 
the Jonsson affidavit under Rule 807. In Copperweld Steel 
Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Bohler, 578 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 
1978), this Court upheld a district court's admission of a 
similar item--a memorandum prepared by a lawyer of an 
executive who was later killed--on a weaker showing by the 
district court under the predecessor rule to Rule 807 (Rule 
804(b)(5)). See id. at 964. We ther efore hold that the 
admission of the Jonsson affidavit was not err or. 
 
2. The Rydstad redaction 
 
Ellwood also contends that the court erred in r equiring 
the redaction of portions of a 1988 memorandum from 
Bertil Rydstad before admitting it into evidence, on the 
basis that the portions redacted were legal conclusions. 
Uddeholm appointed Rydstad in 1987 to work with Ellwood 
at EUS; in March 1988 Rydstad prepar ed a memo detailing 
his understanding of Uddeholm's and Ellwood's rights and 
obligations regarding EUS. The District Court admitted the 
memo into evidence but first required Ellwood to redact the 
following passage from the memo: "Thus, under the 
contracts there are only two purchasers. Nothing, however, 
precluded [sic] them from reselling to a third party." The 
District Court required this language to be redacted on the 
grounds that "it appears to be a legal interpretation by a 
non-legal person, and not even a person who was privy to 
the negotiations [on the Agreement], nor do we have any 
indication that that view was adopted or accepted by 
anybody else in the company in terms of their course of 
dealings." Tr. of Jury Trial, Apr. 1, 1999. The court also 
noted that the redacted statement did not expr ess any 
point of view on whether Ellwood should be able to get 
rebates for ingots sold to third parties, which is really what 
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the dispute over the interpretation of the Agr eement was 
about. 
 
Ellwood argues that the redacted language was essential 
to understanding Uddeholm's interpretation of the 
Agreement at the time, which would ther eby affect the 
court's determination of whether the Agr eement was 
ambiguous as well as the jury's interpretation of the 
Agreement. Under Pennsylvania law, a party's statements 
can be used to interpret a contract or to establish that 
party's understanding of the meaning of the contract. See 
City of Erie v. R.D. McAllister & Son. 204 A.2d 650, 660 (Pa. 
1964); Z &L Lumber Co. of Atlasburg v. Nor dquist, 502 A.2d 
697, 701 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In our view, however, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the 
redaction. It appears from the evidence in the record that 
Rydstad was not trained in the law, nor was he involved in 
the contract negotiations; thus, Rydstad did not seem to 
possess the requisite expertise or backgr ound to draw the 
conclusion contained in the redacted passage. Furthermore, 
despite his role as the point man at Uddeholm for the EUS 
project, there is no evidence that R ydstad's views reflected 
those of Uddeholm or that anyone else at Uddeholm 
adopted them. Finally, because the redacted language did 
not address whether Ellwood could receive rebates on its 
third-party sales, the language does not speak to 
Uddeholm's understanding of the Agreement as to this 
issue, although it seems reasonable that the jury could 
have become confused about that if it had been given the 
memo without the redaction. Thus, it was within the court's 
discretion to require the redaction. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the 
case remanded to the District Court for pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Parties to bear their own 
costs. 
 
                                49 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                50 
